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Abstract 
Standard banking theory suggests that there exists an optimal level of credit risk that yields 
maximum bank profit. We identify the optimal level of risk-weighted assets that maximizes 
banks’ returns in the full sample of US banks over the period 1996–2011. We find that this 
optimal level is cyclical, being higher than the realized credit risk in relatively stable periods 
with high profit opportunities for banks but quickly decreasing below the realized in periods 
of turmoil. We place this cyclicality into the nexus between bank risk and monetary policy. 
We show that a contractionary monetary policy in stable periods, where the optimal credit 
risk is higher than the realized credit risk, increases the gap between them. An increase in this 
gap also comes as a result of an expansionary monetary policy in bad economic periods, 
where the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk.     
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1. Introduction 
Bank managers make risky decisions about the transformation of liabilities to assets so as to 
produce profits. However, they can also produce large losses if they take on too much risk or 
if structural and macroeconomic conditions change unexpectedly. This implies that the risk–
return relationship is nonlinear and there should be an optimal level of credit risk. Further, the 
inherent maturity mismatch between the asset and liability sides of the bank balance sheet 
causes a problem of time inconsistency: banks might alter their optimal risk decisions in 
different times. Despite the fundamental role of this idea in any theoretical model of bank risk 
and default, the empirical literature has largely neglected distinguishing between the realized 
and optimal (equilibrium) credit risk for the average bank and over time. Thus, the important 
implications of this distinction for the monetary and macroeconomic environment have not 
been studied. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature. 
 Theoretical models of the banking firm operating under adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and/or incomplete contracting assume that banks choose between risky and less risky 
assets and manage liabilities to maximize their value or profits (e.g., John, Saunders, and 
Senbet, 2000; Agur and Demertzis, 2012). Thus, banks make optimal decisions in light of the 
variable microeconomic problems they face, mostly related to informational asymmetry, and 
the regulatory and macroeconomic conditions. In this framework, equilibrium bank behavior 
can be compared and endogenized with optimality conditions for other agents (e.g., 
consumers or regulators) to study more general equilibrium relationships.  
In practice, however, the realized level of credit risk is not equal to the optimal one. 
There can be many interrelated reasons for this discrepancy and three of them seem to be the 
most important ones. First, banks, like any other firm, can simply be inefficient and operate 
below capacity. In this sense, banks may fail to choose the optimal mix or level of risky 
assets, a situation exacerbated during periods of rising uncertainty. Second, the banking 
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sector is notoriously characterized by herding behavior, which is usually pegged to the 
choices of leading banks or to the changing perceptions about the regulatory and 
macroeconomic environment. The history of banking crises has shown that herding behavior 
can be an important element in suboptimal risk decisions of banks in both good and bad 
economic periods (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Third, the maturity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities that is inherent in the banking business implies that the quality 
of bank balance sheets can quickly deteriorate in light of adverse developments due to 
depositor behavior in a classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, credit rationing á la 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and other well-established mechanisms. Thus, banks can find 
themselves in situations where in good times they take on less than the optimal credit risk, 
while in bad times they are exposed to higher than the optimal risk. The outcome of both 
these states is lower than optimal returns.                
We identify deviations between the realized and optimal bank credit risk using a 
simple empirical setup. We assume that bank profits depend on the risk decisions of bank 
managers and bank managers want to maximize returns on assets (or returns on equity if 
there is no principal agent problem). To do so, they seek the optimal level of credit risk. If 
bank managers decide to take on too little credit risk and hold a large share of liquid assets in 
their portfolios, bank profits will not be maximized. Bank returns will also be sub-optimal if 
bank managers take on too much credit risk, leading for example to the accumulation of a 
high volume of nonperforming loans. An important element of this setup is that the level of 
optimal credit risk must be time-varying. For instance, consider the situation in the period 
2001–2007. Perceptions about the stability of the banking system were really optimistic and 
credit risk decisions were paying high yields. This implies that the optimal bank credit risk is 
relatively high during prosperous periods. When the housing bubble burst, banks found 
themselves exposed to very risky positions that started yielding losses because of the surging 
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nonperforming loans. Furthermore, bank managers could not adjust the level of credit risk in 
the very short term, mainly because of issues related to maturity mismatch. Thus, in periods 
of stress, the optimal credit risk should be lower than the actual credit risk held in the 
portfolio of the average bank.  
Using quarterly panel data for virtually all banks that operated in the United States 
(US) during the period 1996–2011, we identify the time-varying optimal level of credit risk 
in terms of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. We indeed find a cyclical 
movement of the optimal level of credit risk, which peaks just before the eruption of the crisis 
in 2006. The optimal credit risk quickly deteriorates from 2007 onward and this leaves banks 
with a higher than optimal credit risk in the crisis period. This explicitly shows how the 
deviations between the realized and optimal credit risk, owing to the three main channels 
highlighted above, leaves banks operating in a suboptimal way.  
These deviations have interesting implications for the monetary and the 
macroeconomic environment. A recent literature examines the interplay between banks’ risk, 
monetary policy, and macroeconomic outcomes, suggesting that a monetary expansion leads 
banks to take on higher risks (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro, 2009; Delis, Hasan, and 
Mylonidis, 2011). Our analysis is not about identifying the potency of this mechanism, which 
is termed the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Instead, we opt for identifying a relation 
between the macroeconomic and monetary conditions, and the deviations between the 
optimal and the realized actual risk in bank portfolios. To this end, we use a vector error 
correction model (VECM) and time-series data on the federal funds rate and the median risk-
weighted assets of US banks. We show that the optimal monetary policy from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint increases the deviations between the realized and optimal credit of 
banks, thus pushing banks to a suboptimal disequilibrium situation. In line with our result, 
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Agur and Demertzis (2013) use a relevant theoretical model and show that because bank risk 
is sticky, monetary policy should keep rate cuts short to prevent excessive risk buildup. 
Specifically, in good economic periods, the Fed has incentives to increase the interest 
rates. In these periods, where the optimal level of banks’ credit risk is higher than the realized 
risk, we show that a monetary contraction will not only decrease the realized credit risk (in 
line with the existence of a risk-taking channel) but also increase the optimal level of credit 
risk. Similarly, in periods of turmoil in the banking sector, where the optimal level of banks’ 
credit risk is lower than the realized risk, we show that a monetary expansion will increase 
the realized credit risk and decrease the optimal level of credit risk. Therefore, in both good 
and bad periods, the “optimal” monetary policy choices by the Fed aiming at smoothing the 
business cycle, force the realized level of banks’ credit risk out of equilibrium. We contend 
that this finding has important policy implications for both the conduct of monetary policy 
and the prudential regulation of banks.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model 
used to estimate the optimal level of credit risk and the data set. Section 3 presents the 
estimation results for the optimal level of credit risk. Section 4 examines the macroeconomic 
relations between the optimal level of credit risk, the realized credit risk, and the monetary 
conditions.  Section 5 concludes the paper.     
             
2. Identification of the optimal credit risk 
2.1. Profitability equation and risky assets 
Most theoretical studies model the banking firm as a wealth- or profit-maximizing entity. The 
premise is that banks use a set of inputs to invest in risky assets with a high return and in less 
risky assets with a low return (e.g., John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000). The bank is also 
required to hold a fair amount of reserves with the central bank as well as capital to absorb 
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losses. Thus, the basic banking model can consider the presence of reserve requirements, 
capital regulation, or other forms of intervention. The bank decides on the optimal allocation 
of resources of high- and low-risk assets given its budget constraint and the “safe and sound” 
banking constraint posed by the regulator (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988). One can also 
think that the bank has its own soundness constraint if its decision is to maximize wealth or 
profits subject to minimizing the probability of default. This relates to the notion of the 
market discipline of the banking firm (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).    
Hughes and Mester (1994; 1998) provide an influential empirical counterpart of this 
theoretical framework. The first of these studies tests whether bank managers are acting in 
the shareholders’ interest and maximizing expected profits or a utility function that trades off 
risk for return. The findings rule in favor of the trade-off between profit and risk. The second 
study shows that in a similar model of the banking firm, banks of different size classes 
exhibit behavior consistent with risk aversion.  
This basic modeling of the banking firm yields a profit equation of the form (or 
similar to): 
 =  +  +  − 
∑  ,  −  (1) 
In this profit function, y1 is the quantity of the risky asset (credit risk), which earns an average 
interest rate p1. p2 is the interest rate on the risk-free asset y2, and p3y3 is the revenue from 
other sources not directly related with credit risk. We can consider that y1 + y2 represents the 
total assets of bank i used to generate profits, while 3 3p y  represents the noninterest income. 
Bank outputs are produced using input prices w and the bank draws capital K (at some rate 
pk), which can be of the form of equity capital or debt-based capital. As in John, Saunders, 
and Senbet (2000), assuming that the bank maximizes expected profits by deciding on the 
optimal mix of risky and riskless assets, standard microeconomic theory suggests that the 
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profit function will be concave in y1 if the cost function is convex (Hughes and Mester, 
1994).     
In the empirical banking literature (e.g., Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2010), the 
identification of the factors explaining profits comes from a specification where the returns 
on assets or equity are regressed on a number of bank characteristics including those of 
equation (1). As profits are normalized with respect to the total assets or equity, it is usual 
practice to normalize the rest of the bank characteristics, including the variable used as a 
measure of credit risk y. To identify the global maximum point, where the marginal impact of 
credit risk (i.e., the risky assets) turns negative, we estimate the following profit equation: 
  =  + , +  +  +  + ,     (2) 
where Π is the return on assets (or equity) of bank i at time t; r ≡ y1 denotes credit risk, c is a 
vector of control variables observed at the bank level that include, inter alia, the risk-free 
asset; and u is the disturbance. Here uit can be analyzed as 
 =  +  + ,         (3) 
where λt denotes time fixed effects, vi denotes bank fixed effects, and eit is the remainder 
disturbance. The presence of the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables 
is in line with the evidence that bank profits persist (Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson, 
2011). From equation (2), we identify the level of r that maximizes Π by setting the partial 
derivative of Π with respect to r equal to zero, i.e.,  
 ! " = 0 =>  = − %&%'.        (4) 
   
2.2. Data 
We obtain bank-level quarterly data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Call reports. We start with the full sample of US commercial banks for the period 1996Q1 to 
2011Q4, but we drop a number of observations where the values of our main variables are 
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quite unreasonable (e.g., negative values of bank assets). The reason our sample starts in 
1996 is that data on risk-weighted assets, our main measure of risky assets, are unavailable 
before this date. Our final sample consists of 574,532 observations. Table 1 provides formal 
definitions for the variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 reports summary 
statistics. 
[Insert Tables 1&2 about here] 
 We measure bank profits using the return on assets and equity in alternative 
specifications. While deciding on the risk strategy of banks, most bank managers consider the 
return on assets as the most important measure of bank profits. In turn, a high return on 
equity is the primary objective of bank shareholders. Given that we are primarily interested in 
risk decisions, which are made by bank managers, we use the return on assets as our main 
dependent variable and provide sensitive analysis on the basis of the return on equity.  
Concerning the measures of high- and low-risk assets, we follow the regulatory 
definition of risky and riskless assets from the FDIC (2012). In particular, we use the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets (named risk-weighted assets) to proxy the risky decisions 
of bank managers. In calculating this ratio different weights are assigned to different types of 
bank assets under the guidelines of the Basel Accord (e.g., Basel, 2011). This ratio measures 
ex ante as opposed to ex post risk of banks and this is the main reason it is favored by bank 
regulators and used in our empirical analysis. The Basel accord explains why using a risk-
weight approach is the preferred methodology for the calculation of the risk position of 
banks. First, this ratio provides an easier approach to compare the riskiness of banks within 
and across countries; second, off-balance-sheet exposures can be easily included in capital 
adequacy calculations; and third banks are not deterred from carrying low risk liquid assets in 
their books. One could further differentiate between the various risky assets to obtain a more 
complex picture of the risk decisions of bank managers. For example, we may consider 
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separate categories of loans bearing different risk weights under Basel II. However, the 
purpose of this study is to identify the optimal bank risk for the average bank in terms of total 
credit risk and not to provide a complex analysis of the shares of various risky assets in bank 
portfolios.  
To control for the riskless assets in bank portfolios we use the ratio of liquid assets to 
the total assets (liquidity). Further, to avoid associating ex ante bank risk with risk arising ex 
post, we also control for the level of problem loans and loan-loss provisions (see Table 1 for 
explicit definitions). The inclusion of the problem-loans variable (named problem loans) 
suggests that bank managers make risk decisions today while knowing the level of problem 
loans in their portfolios. Similar to problem loans, the provisions variable (named provisions) 
does not capture the level of risk-taking per se, but it relates to managers’ expectations about 
future losses in case of adverse developments. Given that these expectations may or may not 
be realized, provisions represents another aspect of credit risk reflecting the level of bank 
managers’ risk aversion. Thus, we assume that problem loans, provisions, and risk-weighted 
assets should be simultaneously included in our model, while we confirm in sensitivity 
analysis that exclusion of the former two variables does not yield significantly different 
results. Table 3 also shows that the pairwise correlation coefficients between risk-weighted 
assets and the other two risk-related variables are quite small. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 For the empirical estimation of equation (2), we use a number of additional bank-level 
control variables. In particular, we control for (i) bank size using the natural logarithm of real 
total assets (deflated by the GDP deflator), (ii) bank capital using the ratio of equity capital to 
the total assets, and (iii) other sources of bank income using the ratio of the noninterest 
income to total income. The use of bank size and capital allow controlling for the profits 
arising from economies of scale and imperfections in capital markets, respectively. The 
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noninterest income variable captures profits generated from nontraditional bank activities and 
is controlled for to prevent the risk-weighted assets variable from capturing the impact of 
these activities on bank profits. All these are in line with the discussion of equation (1).1  
An important feature of the data from the Call reports is that many of the variables 
display high seasonality. This is mostly the case with bank profits. Within each year, the 
lowest profits are observed on average in quarter 1 and the highest profits are observed in 
quarter 4. A similar pattern is observed to a different degree with many other of our bank-
level variables. To avoid introducing a bias in our results because of the differences in the 
level of seasonality between the dependent and explanatory variables, we seasonally adjust 
the data. Specifically, we estimate equations of the form 
  ( =  + ) + ) + )* + +,      (5) 
where xit is one of Πit, rit, cit and D2, D3, D4 are equal to 1 in quarters 2, 3, and 4, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. The estimation method for equation (5) is OLS on the fixed effects 
model. Then, we calculate the seasonally adjusted variables as  
(%,- = +̂.          (6) 
In some of the estimated equations, where we do not use time effects as in equation 
(3), we include a number of variables common to all banks that characterize the 
macroeconomic environment. First, we capture the changing macroeconomic conditions 
using the GDP growth rate. Second, we use the ratio of the dollar value of loans provided by 
commercial banks over GDP. This variable captures changes in the average credit conditions 
nationally.2 These variables drop out when using time effects; thus, we employ them only to 
check the robustness of our results. Our data source for these variables is the Federal Reserve. 
 
                                                          
1
 We experiment with many other bank-specific control variables, such as the ratios of loans to assets, loans to 
deposits, and cost to income. The main results remain unaffected. 
2
 We experiment with many other macroeconomic variables as well as with regional dummies, etc. The results 
remain unaffected and are available on request. 
11 
 
2.3. Estimation of the profitability equation    
It is widely recognized in the banking literature that bank characteristics like risk and capital 
are endogenous in the profitability equation. A first concern, which is the most important in 
our case, relates to reverse causality. For example, a profitable bank will use part of the 
profits made at time t as loanable funds and another part as capital, creating an obvious 
reverse causality mechanism between banks’ returns and risk and equity capital. The richness 
of the data set (especially the quarterly time dimension) allows us to mitigate problems 
arising from reverse causality by using the first lags of the explanatory variables instead of 
their contemporaneous values. Thus, we assume that the bank characteristics at quarter t-1 
determine profits at time t.3 In this sense, we can rewrite equation (2) as 
      =  + , + , + , + , + .    (7) 
Equation (7) is in line with the theoretical suggestion that bank managers decide on the level 
of credit risk today to materialize returns in a future date. To capture a different time pattern, 
where credit risk today materializes in returns at another quarter in the future, we also 
experiment with the fourth time lag on r and we show that this does not affect the results. 
Assuming no other source of endogeneity for the right-hand-side variables, we can estimate 
equation (7) with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors (e.g., Berger, 
Hasan and Zhou, 2010).4    
However, another source of endogeneity can arise from omitted variables bias. For 
example, risk-weighted assets and bank profits can move in the same direction owing to 
changes in the structural and macroeconomic conditions common to all banks. Further, it 
could be the case that the relationship between risk-weighted assets and banks’ returns is 
                                                          
3
 It would be more problematic to establish causality if we had annual data. In that case, profits would have been 
determined by the bank’s characteristics in the previous year. However, in empirical banking studies, one year 
can be a time period within which major changes can occur that affect bank performance.    
4
 As is well-known in the econometrics literature, estimation of an equation like (7) with a fixed effects model 
is, in general, inconsistent because of the correlation between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable. However, for panels with large time and cross-sectional dimensions, the estimates from different 
methods converge (Baltagi, 2008). We confirm this in the empirical analysis below.  
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affected by certain bank characteristics that are not controlled for in the empirical model. 
However, note that the empirical model includes both bank and time fixed effects, and these 
should lessen such a bias. To confirm that this type of endogeneity does not drive our results, 
we also use instrumental variables procedures such as the limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) for panel data with robust standard errors or the two-stage system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) of Blundell and Bond (1998) with robust standard 
errors (correction of Windmeijer, 2005). 
LIML is a two-stage procedure that requires at least one instrumental variable that 
does not have a direct effect on bank profitability or an effect running through omitted 
variables (i.e., validate the exclusion restriction). To this end, we use the implications of the 
recent literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and 
Peydro, 2009; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2011). This literature shows that low interest 
rates increase the average risk-taking behavior of banks for three main reasons. First, a shift 
from a high to low interest rate environment could leave financial institutions with long-term 
fixed rate contracts, seeking out riskier investments in an attempt to meet their liabilities 
(search-for-yield effect). Second, low rates boost asset and collateral values and tend to 
reduce price volatility, which in turn downsize bank estimates of probabilities of default and 
encourage higher risk positions (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Third, the commitment, for example, 
of a central bank for lower (future) interest rates in the case of a threatening shock reduces 
the probability of large downside risks, thereby encouraging banks to assume greater risk 
(transparency effect). Given the above, there should be a direct impact of monetary policy on 
banks’ credit risk. 
In addition, the exclusion restriction is validated if there is no significant correlation 
between the monetary policy variable and the stochastic term u in (7). One may argue that 
bank profits could in fact react to a change in monetary policy (i) if this change is correlated 
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with the general structural and macroeconomic conditions and (ii) through the noninterest 
income that is excluded from the risk-weighted assets. Concerning the first argument and in 
addition to the use of time fixed effects, we consider the exogenous monetary policy shocks. 
These are estimated using the so-called Taylor rule residuals obtained from the OLS 
regression of the federal funds rate on GDP growth and inflation (e.g., Maddaloni and 
Peydro, 2011; Brissimis, Delis, and Iosifidi, 2012). Concerning the second argument, the 
inclusion of noninterest income among the control variables reassures that the exogenous 
monetary shocks are not correlated with profits through their impact on sources of bank 
profits other than interest income.  
For the estimation of equation (7) using GMM, we augment the Taylor rule residuals 
with the second lags of all explanatory variables as instruments. By including the second lags 
as instruments (and not the first), we assume that all explanatory variables might be, to some 
extent, endogenous regressors in equation (7). This set of instruments produces acceptable 
values for the test for second-order autocorrelation and for the Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions (for details on these issues, see Roodman, 2009).  
However, before moving on to the analysis of the estimation results, we should note 
that what we seek is the robust estimation of the optimal level of credit risk from equation (4) 
given (2). We will show below that all three estimators considered (OLS on the fixed effects 
model, LIML, and GMM) yield more or less the same values for the optimal credit risk. We 
primarily attribute this to the fact that in very large panels such as ours, the results from all 
estimators converge and the fixed effects estimator becomes consistent as the time dimension 
of the panel increases (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, in our setting, even the simplest estimation 
methods, such as OLS, seem to produce robust estimates of the optimal credit risk.   
 
3. Estimation results for the optimal credit risk 
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3.1. Baseline estimation results and robustness 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of alternative specifications of equation (7). In 
all regressions, the dependent variable is the return on assets, except from that in column 
(10), where we use the return on equity. In line with the discussion in Section 2.1, all the 
results verify that the relationship between credit risk and bank profitability is an inverted U-
shape. In column (1), we start with a very simple model, which is estimated by OLS and 
fixed effects. In column (2), we add quarter (time) effects. The results from these first two 
specifications yield values for the optimal level of credit risk equal to 0.666 and 0.717, 
respectively (we report the optimal point in the line below the results for the coefficient 
estimates). The first value is approximately equal to the mean value of risk-weighted assets in 
our sample (see Table 2), and the second is slightly higher, showing that the average bank in 
our panel could benefit by taking on a slightly higher amount of credit risk.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In columns (3) and (4), we introduce a number of bank-level control variables in the 
equations with and without quarter effects, respectively. The results show a slight increase in 
the value of the optimal credit risk in the model without quarter effects, while the optimal 
point in the model with quarter effects is about the same as the equivalent in column (2). We 
feel that this pattern in the results comes from the importance of time fixed effects in 
reducing omitted variables bias. Thus, we consider the equations with time fixed effects as 
those yielding estimates with lower bias. Moreover, in column (5), we drop the quarter 
effects and add year effects among the explanatory variables, and this yields very similar 
results to those in column (4). Further, in columns (6) and (7), we introduce the two 
macroeconomic variables, named Growth and Credit by banks. To do this, we drop the 
quarter effects (due to collinearity) and only add year effects in column (7). Evidently, both 
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the coefficient estimates and the level of optimal bank credit risk remain practically 
unaffected.    
 So far, we have estimated equation (7) using OLS. We now relax the assumption that 
there is no endogeneity arising from omitted variables bias and use LIML and GMM for 
dynamic panels. We present the results from these regressions in columns (8) and (9). The 
results from the LIML estimates show that the optimal level of credit risk is 0.7 and the 
results from the GMM estimates show the risk to be 0.712. Thus, the optimal level of credit 
risk is not driven by the estimation method. We also confirm this finding for the other 
specifications of equation (7). This is an expected result because for panels with very large 
time and cross-sectional dimensions, the results from all estimators converge (Baltagi, 2008). 
Thus, the OLS model with bank fixed effects and quarter fixed effects seems to be sufficient 
to robustly estimate the optimal level of credit risk, and is the one favored in the rest of the 
specifications owing to its simplicity and asymptotic efficiency. In the last regression of 
Table 4, presented in column (10), we examine the sensitivity of the results to the use of the 
return on equity as the dependent variable. We find that the optimal level of credit risk is 
equal to 0.715, which is almost equal to the equivalent specification with the return on assets 
as the dependent variable, i.e., that in column (4).  
As a final sensitivity analysis of these baseline results, we consider whether the 
optimal level of credit risk changes when we assume a different lag structure for risk-
weighted assets. We start by simultaneously using the first three lags of risk-weighted assets 
and its squared term in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. This specification implicitly assumes 
that the risk decisions of bank managers in quarters t-1 to t-3 affect bank performance at time 
t. Adding up the coefficients from the three lags and taking the derivative as in equation (4) 
yields an optimal level of credit risk very similar to that reported in Table 4.  
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Furthermore, in column (3), we report the results from the specification where risk-
weighted assets and its squared term are lagged four times (i.e., we use the annual lag). In this 
specification, we assume that the risk decisions of banks at quarter t-4 affect the profitability 
at quarter t. Under this assumption, the level of the optimal credit risk equals 0.67, which is 
only 0.04 points lower than the one identified in column (4) of Table 4. We consider many 
other variants for the lag structure of the risk-weighted assets, including the simultaneous 
inclusion of the first four, first eight, and first 16 lags. Changes in the optimal level of credit 
risk are not significant and these results are available on request.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 So far, we have identified that the optimal level of credit risk for the average bank in 
our sample is between 0.69 and 0.71 for the most prominent specifications of equation (7). 
These values are somewhat higher than the actual value of risk-weighted assets for the 
average bank, showing that banks could on average gain in profitability by increasing their 
risk. The coefficient estimate in column (4) of Table 4 shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in risk-weighted assets will increase the return on assets of the average bank by 
approximately 0.04 points (up to the point where risk-weighted assets equals 0.71). Thus, for 
example, a 0.04 increase in risk-weighted assets from 0.67 to 0.71 will raise the return on 
assets by approximately 0.0016. Considering that the return on assets for the average bank 
equals 0.007, this is a very large increase (approximately equal to 23%). Of course, this result 
is valid under the assumption that the optimal point is constant across time and banks with 
different characteristics. We relax this assumption below.    
 
3.2. Time-varying optimal credit risk 
In this section, we consider whether the optimal level of credit risk varies with time. To 
identify this time-varying optimal level, we consider estimating the equation 
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 =  + , + , + , + , +     
∑ /-0- 1-,+∑ 2-0- 1-, + ∑ ℎ-1-0- +  ,    (8) 
where qj are quarter dummies. Therefore, in equation (8), we obtain time-varying coefficients 
for r and r2 by interacting these variables with the quarter fixed effects.5 Subsequently, we 
calculate the optimal level of credit risk from the equation  
 ! " = 0 =>  = − %&45%'46 .        (9) 
 In Table 6, we present the estimation results from three different specifications of 
equation (8).6 In the first two columns, we present the results from equations with the return 
on assets and the return on equity as dependent variables. In column (3), we present the 
equivalent results from a moving-average model. Estimation method is OLS on the fixed 
effects model with robust standard errors and we verify that results do not change when using 
the LIML and the GMM methods. We find that all three specifications yield similar results.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Figure 1, we plot the time-varying coefficient estimates (solid line), along with 
associated confidence intervals, against the quarterly average of risk-weighted assets 
(realized credit risk). Clearly, the two are not equal, reflecting disequilibrium in the handling 
of risk-weighted assets by bank managers. The quarterly trend of the optimal risk reveals an 
interesting pattern. During the relatively good periods for the economy, the optimal level of 
credit risk is above the average credit risk, while the opposite is true after relatively bad 
periods. For example, consider the period before the attack on the World Trade Centre in 
2001. For about two years after the attack, the optimal level of credit risk remained below its 
average value. Subsequently, in most of the period 2003–2007, which is a period of 
                                                          
5
 One could instead consider a time-varying model (e.g., Swamy, 1970). However, this class of models does not 
run for a panel with a size such as ours using a CORE i7vPro processor and 6.00 GB of RAM. 
6
 Owing to space considerations, we do not replicate the full set of results in Tables 4 and 5. We rely on the 
equivalent specifications to the ones presented in columns (4) and (10) of Table 4. Similar to the findings in 
Section 3.1, changes in the results from using the other specifications are insignificant.  
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considerable expansion in risk-weighted assets, the optimal credit risk is again higher than the 
average. Finally, since 2008, the optimal credit risk remains at the lowest level of our sample 
period, well below the realized level of credit risk.     
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 This observed pattern has a number of economic implications. First and most obvious, 
the optimal level of credit risk leads the business cycle, while the realized credit risk follows 
the business cycle closely. Second, during good economic periods, banks have clear 
incentives to take on higher credit risk to maximize profits. However, this optimal bank 
behavior changes very quickly when adverse shocks hit the economy, leaving banks exposed 
to higher than optimal levels of risk. This stems from (i) the standard issue of maturity 
mismatch between bank assets and liabilities, (ii) the changing informational asymmetry 
(moral hazard and adverse selection) over the business and credit cycles, which cause 
changes in the efficient intermediation of funds, and (iii) the herding behavior of banks, 
which can cause by itself a disequilibrium situation in the risk-taking behavior of the banking 
sector. It is fairly obvious from Figure 1 that banks could not lower the level of credit risk 
close to the optimal level when the depth of the financial crisis became apparent in 2008. 
This is most probably owing to the fact that banks could not lower the volume of long-term 
loans, many of which were in fact nonperforming. 
 There are two more implications emerging from Figure 1. On the one hand, the 
average bank has clear economic incentives to take on higher credit risk during good 
economic times in search for yield. Yet, what is optimal from the micromanagerial 
perspective is far from optimal from the macroprudential perspective. Phrased differently, the 
level of credit risk that maximizes bank profits can be unsustainable in the long run, either 
because of the inability of banks to adjust their portfolios quickly in case of adverse 
developments or because of myopic behavior attributed to herding. On the other hand, the 
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average bank does not have to be the one causing the crisis. It can take only a small number 
of very risky players to increase systemic risk to very high levels. Therefore, the fact that the 
optimal credit risk is higher than the realized one for some time before 2007 does not 
necessarily mean that this average bank behavior caused the subprime meltdown. Clearly, 
this requires additional analysis.    
 We can check this latter hypothesis by examining the risky behavior of the banks that 
failed in the period 2008–2009. In Figure 2, we replicate Figure 1, but we also add the 
quarterly average of risk-weighted assets of the banks that failed. Evidently, these banks have 
an average ratio of risk-weighted assets higher than the optimal level in almost the entire 
2001–2008 period. This observation makes a case for bad managerial decisions for the 
involved banks, lack of private monitoring and market discipline, as well as inefficient 
supervision.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
     
4. Optimal credit risk and the macroeconomic environment 
4.1. Theoretical considerations 
The subprime financial and the subsequent euro-area crises recalled the importance of the 
banking sector in shaping macroeconomic outcomes in the most emphatic way. In Section 3.2 
and Figures 1 and 2, we infer that the cyclicality of the optimal bank credit risk is a leading 
indicator of the business cycle and that the cyclicality of realized credit risk is procyclical. 
Thus, the two indicators allow drawing some new insights into the interplay between banks’ 
risk and the monetary and macroeconomic environment.  
 In Section 2.3, we highlight the main mechanisms through which low interest rates 
can increase bank risk and show that the empirical literature rules in favor of a negative 
relationship between monetary policy rates and bank risk. The theory behind the risk-taking 
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channel of monetary policy provides more mixed results. The models typically assume that 
banks choose their asset mix and leverage to maximize profits (e.g., Agur and Demertzis, 
2012; Dell’ Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2010). This setup allows banks to choose between 
a continuum of risky assets and different risk profiles. In either way, these theoretical 
frameworks predict that the nexus between monetary policy and bank risk depends on many 
factors, including the relative health of the banking system, the efficiency level of banks, and 
the state of the macroeconomic environment.  
From our viewpoint, the studies by Agur and Demertzis (2012; 2013) are quite 
important in that banks choose their asset profile according to their efficiency. This is 
relevant to our empirical model in that inefficient banking can cause deviations from the 
optimal level of risk. Thus, by affecting both the cost of debt financing (thus also the realized 
credit risk) and the optimal debt choice of the bank, monetary policy can affect the gap 
between the realized and the optimal credit risk. The issue here is that an expansionary 
monetary policy positively affects asset and collateral values, and banks appear to have less 
risky portfolios. In other words, this mechanism is about the risk already present in bank 
portfolios and not solely about new risk. Our measures of realized and optimal credit risk 
correspond exactly to this theoretical interpretation of the nexus between monetary policy and 
bank risk, making our variables ideal to study the macroeconomic implications of optimal vs. 
realized credit risk.  
In this framework, our analysis is concerned with testing macroeconomic equilibrium 
relationships among the monetary conditions, realized credit risk taken by banks, and optimal 
risk that maximizes bank profits within a time-series setting. This strategy has the obvious 
advantage of considering a limited number of variables and using all these variables as 
endogenous. With these issues in mind we proceed to the time-series empirical analysis.  
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4.2. Empirical analysis  
We study the interplay among monetary policy, credit risk, and real outcomes using a VECM 
of the form 
78 =  + 98 + ∑ :-78-;- +  ,                (10) 
where Y is the (4X1) vector of endogenous variables, K and Γi are (4X4) matrices, and p is 
the lag length of the corresponding VAR. The disturbances  are assumed to follow a four-
dimensional Gaussian process with a zero mean and a nonsingular, finite, covariance matrix 
Ω. The four endogenous variables we use are (i) the federal funds rate (ffr) as our measure of 
the monetary conditions,7 (ii) the series of the optimal bank risk (optimal risk), (iii) the series 
of the realized bank risk (realized risk), and (iv) real output (measured by the log of real 
GDP). 
The results from two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) and the GLS Dickey Fuller (see Elliott et al., 1996) tests, show that all four 
variables are stationary in first differences (Table 7). Thus, the above series are well-modeled 
by unit root processes. To test for cointegration we employ Johansen’s (1988) system 
approach. We consider all possible lag orders selected by the model selection criteria, namely 
the Akaike Information Criterion, the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion, the Final 
Prediction Error Criterion, and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. These criteria are 
asymptotically equivalent but their results may vary in small samples. In theory, selecting the 
number of lagged differences to be smaller than the correct one will distort the size of the 
tests, while selecting orders greater than the correct one will result in loss of power. Given the 
sample size, the maximum possible lag order is set to four.  
                                                          
7
 Given that in the VECM, all variables are allowed to be endogenous by definition, we use the federal funds 
rate instead of the Taylor rule residuals that we used as an instrumental variable above (e.g., Buch, Eickmeier, 
and Prieto, 2010). Note that since the impact of policy shocks is through bank risk (either credit risk or 
noninterest income), the inclusion of the federal funds rate as an independent variable in equations (7) and (8) 
would not have any implications for the modeling choices in identifying the optimal level of bank risk. If 
anything, this would be owing to multicollineartiy, which we do not find to be present.  
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
When testing for the rank of the full system at the 5% level, the results show two 
cointegrating vectors if the selected lag length is one and one cointegrating vector if the 
selected lag length is two. We end up choosing a lag length equal to two, because selecting a 
lagged order smaller than the true results in inconsistent tests. Thus, our analysis considers 
the following (one) cointegrating vector:  
<1 >1 >2			>3B C DEEFGFHI	FJKDEFLG	FJKM.       (11) 
Subsequently, we estimate the VECM using the reduced rank procedure of Johansen 
(1995) and provide the estimation results in Table 8. For the optimal lag order, we again 
consider all four information criteria. However, these criteria disagree, providing values equal 
to either zero (for the Schwartz criterion) or four (for the other three). We choose the most 
general order of four lags.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Based on the estimation results we can rewrite the cointegration vector as: 
output = -0.352*ffr - 15.982*realized risk + 22.819*optimal risk             (12) 
We observe that all coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. The post-
estimation Lagrange-multiplier tests by Johansen (1995) show that there is no autocorrelation 
in the residuals.8 The Jarque-Bera test for normality does not reject the null hypothesis of 
normal residuals in any of the four equations.9 Finally, we examine the stability of the 
coefficients of the model to guarantee that these are not affected by structural breaks. In 
Figure 3, we show the results for the recursive eigenvalue test of Hansen and Johansen 
(1999). The test does not reject the hypothesis of the long-run parameter stability of the 
eigenvalue at the 5% level.  
                                                          
8
 The p-values for two additional lags are 0.076 and 0.41. 
9
 The Jarque-Bera p-values for the four equations are 0.28, 0.06, 0.39, and 0.46. 
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[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 We are primarily interested in the orthogonal impulse responses involving the 
theoretical considerations discussed in Section 4.1, which we present in Figures 4 to 6. Figure 
4 shows that the realized credit risk responds positively and significantly to a positive change 
in the optimal credit risk. This effect is apparent even from Figure 1 and is intuitive: When 
banks view that their optimal strategy to maximize profits is to take on higher credit risks, 
they are willing to do so in the next quarter.   
[Insert Figures 4-6 about here] 
 Figure 5 shows the response of the realized credit risk to a monetary policy shock. In 
the first five to six quarters, a monetary contraction (rise in the interest rate) reduces banks’ 
risk and vice versa. This result confirms the findings of the empirical literature on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro, 2009; Delis, Hasan and 
Mylonidis, 2011). However, Figure 6 shows that a negative monetary policy shock (rise in 
the interest rate) raises the optimal risk-weighted assets of banks. The response is a positive 
and statistically significant one, which lasts over the long-term. The level of the increase is 
also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate will 
increase the optimal risk-weighted assets by approximately 0.010 points in the first year and 
for each year thereafter. For a bank with an optimal level of risk-weighted assets, as given by 
specification (4) of Table 4, this will imply a rise of the optimal level from 0.711 to 0.723, 
which is indeed a large fluctuation for one year. 
 An explanation for this finding is that a reduction in the policy rate leads to lower 
deposit rates. Because the loan demand is negatively sloped, the reduction in deposit rates is 
only partially passed to the lending rates. This increases the intermediation margin and 
provides banks with incentives to take on higher risks, because expected profits will also be 
higher. Given the implications of Figure 4, banks will do so in the next period, and this 
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diminishes the original negative shock presented in Figure 5 after period six. Thus, we offer 
an additional mechanism working along with the negative effect of monetary policy on 
banks’ risk.  
 The most interesting implication of this case comes from the fact that a monetary 
policy shock tends to pull the realized and the optimal credit risk further apart in the short 
run. Phrased differently, the optimal monetary policy from a business-cycle perspective will 
always widen the gap between the realized and optimal credit risk of banks, pushing banks 
out of equilibrium. To see this, consider the following sequence of events. In good economic 
periods, interest rates are higher to prevent the economy from over-burning. Based on our 
impulse responses, the rise in interest rates will lower the realized credit risk (Figure 5) and 
increase the optimal credit risk (Figure 6). Given that in these periods, the optimal credit risk 
is usually higher than the realized credit risk (Figure 1), the gap between the two widens. A 
similar result emerges in bad economic periods, where the optimal monetary policy is to cut 
rates. This leads to an increase in the realized credit risk and a fall in the optimal credit risk. 
Given that in these periods, the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk, the result is again 
a widening in the gap between the two. 
 Another mechanism through which changes in the monetary policy rate distort the 
equilibrium risk behavior of banks relates to the interest-rate risk. This is the risk that the 
value of real assets will change owing to a change in the absolute level of interest rates, in the 
spread between two rates, in the shape of the yield curve, or in any other interest rate 
relationship. Naturally, all these interest rates are affected by the central bank rate. Our 
analysis is then consistent with the idea that following a monetary policy shock, it takes 
banks considerable time to adjust their valuation of assets and determine the optimal level of 
credit risk. In the meantime, the average bank either does not have the capacity to estimate 
the effect of interest-rate risk on its portfolio and determine its actual level of credit risk in 
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the very short run or maturity mismatch does not allow the bank to quickly adjust in light of 
the monetary shock. This is also the essence of the theoretical model of Agur and Demertzis 
(2013) who show that because bank risk cannot be easily adjusted in the short run, monetary 
policy cuts should be short-lived to prevent excessive risk buildup.  
In the VECM presented above, one can include a measure of bank capitalization or 
other macroeconomic variables, such as the inflation rate or a measure of monetary 
aggregates. This exercise yields very similar results, which are available on request. In 
addition, one can use the rest of the time series produced by the other specifications in Table 
5 or the equivalent ones in Table 4. Again, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar. One can further infer on the effect of the monetary-policy-induced disequilibrium in 
banks’ optimal risky strategy on real output. Our results show that the widening of the gap 
increases output in good economic times and decreases output in bad economic times. In 
other words, monetary policy can increase macroeconomic fluctuations through its impact on 
“disequilibrium banking.” However, we should treat this result with caution as general 
implications for the real economy would probably need a more lengthy time series with 
additional business cycles. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy considerations 
This paper identifies for the first time the level of banks’ credit risk that maximizes profits 
using the full sample of US banks over the period 1996Q1–2011q4. This optimal 
(equilibrium) level of credit risk is different from the actual realized credit risk present in 
bank portfolios and reflects the level of credit risk a bank would take if it were to function in 
a fully-efficient profit-maximizing way and perfectly forecast the upcoming macroeconomic 
conditions, while prudential regulation would assist banks toward these goals. This “idyllic” 
situation would essentially reduce the probability of default to a minimum, primarily by 
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reducing the effects of maturity mismatch and fluctuating asymmetric information on the 
probability of bank default.  
 We show that the optimal credit risk leads the business cycle, while the realized credit 
risk closely follows the business cycle. In good economic periods, which are characterized by 
credit expansion, the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized risk, while this picture 
completely reverses in bad economic periods. Subsequently, using an error correction model, 
we demonstrate that the optimal monetary policy in smoothing the business cycle always 
leads to an increase in the gap between the equilibrium and realized credit risk of banks. This 
is because a contractionary monetary policy in good economic periods, where the optimal 
credit risk is higher than the realized risk, decreases the realized credit risk but increases the 
optimal credit risk. Similarly, an expansionary monetary policy in bad economic periods, 
where the optimal credit risk is lower than the realized risk, increases the realized credit risk 
but decreases the optimal credit risk. 
 In essence, our results offer another point in favor of the proponents of counter-
cyclical bank regulation in the form of capital requirements and of those suggesting that 
monetary policy should lean against the wind. The obvious implication is that monetary 
policy and prudential regulation need to be closely linked to prevent the disequilibrium 
situation described in this paper. In fact, there are three choices: the conduct of monetary 
policy will incorporate elements of bank risk and financial stability or prudential bank 
regulation will be cyclical, or both. These suggestions have their own merits and drawbacks 
and the literature on this issue is flourishing. For example, Angeloni and Faia (2010) employ 
a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework extended to incorporate the 
banking sector and show that the best policy (out of a set of policies that they consider) for 
crisis prevention is the combination of mild anti-cyclical capital requirements and a monetary 
policy that reacts to inflation and “leans-against-the-winds.” Similar results are obtained by 
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Gambacorta and Signoretti (2012). It is apparent that more work is required on the real 
outcomes of the pass-through of monetary policy through banks. It is also apparent that the 
implementation of the new banking regulation regime under Basel III should consider the 
effects of monetary policy in shaping equilibrium bank behavior.      
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
   
A. Dependent variables 
 
Return on assets Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Call reports 
Return on equity Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
 
 
B. Explanatory variables 
   
Risk weighted assets Risk-weighted assets/ total assets Call reports 
Risk-based capital ratio Total risk-based capital/ risk weighted assets Call reports 
Bank size Natural logarithm of real total assets Call reports 
Capital Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
Liquidity Liquid assets (cash and short-term government bonds)/ total assets Call reports 
Non-interest income Non-interest income/ total income Call reports 
Problem loans Non-performing loans (>90 days)/ total loans Call reports 
Provisions Loan loss provisions/ total loans Call reports 
Growth GDP growth rate (annual %) Federal Reserve 
Credit by banks Loans provided by commercial banks/ GDP Federal Reserve 
Federal funds rate The effective federal funds rate Federal Reserve 
CPI Consumer Price Index Federal Reserve 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on assets 574,532 0.007 0.010 -0.257 0.488 
Return on equity 574,532 0.077 0.103 -1.994 1.970 
Risk-weighted assets 574,532 0.670 0.132 0.100 0.998 
Risk-based capital ratio 574,532 0.178 0.136 -0.344 9.228 
Bank size 574,532 11.786 1.367 6.889 21.584 
Capital 574,532 0.107 0.053 -0.242 1.000 
Liquidity 574,532 0.060 0.063 0.000 0.909 
Non-interest income 574,532 0.111 0.087 0.000 1.000 
Problem loans 574,532 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.748 
Provisions 574,532 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.748 
Growth 574,532 0.024 0.020 -0.046 0.052 
Credit by banks 526,497 959.1 354.2 510.7 1,796.4 
Federal funds rate 574,532 3.245 2.139 0.073 6.520 
Consumer price index 574,532 0.610 0.529 -2.300 1.600 
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Table 3 
Correlations matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Risk-weighted assets 1.000            
2. Risk-based capital ratio -0.439 1.000           
3. Bank size 0.300 -0.342 1.000          
4. Capital -0.213 0.818 -0.334 1.000         
5. Liquidity -0.248 0.112 -0.067 0.024 1.000        
6. Non-interest income 0.028 -0.023 0.145 -0.005 0.056 1.000       
7. Problem loans 0.019 -0.080 0.218 -0.107 0.098 0.074 1.000      
8. Provisions -0.125 0.084 0.027 0.008 0.131 0.050 0.394 1.000     
9. Growth -0.187 0.093 -0.379 0.048 0.011 -0.097 -0.182 -0.022 1.000    
10. Federal funds rate -0.087 0.098 -0.431 0.072 -0.088 -0.293 -0.242 -0.116 0.561 1.000   
11. Credit by banks -0.182 0.084 -0.481 0.044 0.013 -0.259  -0.138 -0.042 0.436 0.695 1.000  
12. CPI 0.007 0.014 -0.011 0.012 -0.036 0.003  -0.058 -0.019 0.287 0.188 -0.090 1.000 
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Table 4 
Optimal bank credit risk: Basic specifications 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Return on assets t-1 0.566*** 
(70.899) 
0.551*** 
(64.012) 
0.513*** 
(54.055) 
0.503*** 
(49.960) 
0.488*** 
(48.452) 
0.492*** 
(48.236) 
0.483*** 
(46.085) 
0.480*** 
(35.473) 
0.896*** 
(18.110) 
 
Return on equityt-1 
 
         0.521*** 
(78.613) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.048*** 
(15.107) 
0.056*** 
(16.675) 
0.033*** 
(10.726) 
0.037*** 
(11.846) 
0.040*** 
(12.784) 
0.044*** 
(11.913) 
0.043*** 
(11.736) 
0.748*** 
(5.981) 
0.182*** 
(3.950) 
0.139*** 
(7.361) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.036*** 
(-15.298) 
-0.039*** 
(-16.187) 
-0.024*** 
(-10.853) 
-0.026*** 
(-11.500) 
-0.028*** 
(-12.255) 
-0.032*** 
(-11.758) 
-0.030*** 
(-11.228) 
-0.530*** 
(-6.014) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.830) 
-0.097*** 
(-6.858) 
Bank size
 t-1   -0.001*** 
(-14.341) 
0.001*** 
(11.999) 
0.001*** 
(12.680) 
0.000*** 
(4.269) 
0.001*** 
(11.459) 
-0.003*** 
(-6.825) 
-0.020*** 
(-4.210) 
0.005*** 
(7.112) 
Capital
 t-1   -0.018*** 
(-16.383) 
-0.013*** 
(-11.323) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.831) 
-0.015*** 
(-12.456) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.175) 
0.013*** 
(2.435) 
-0.060*** 
(-3.110) 
-0.093*** 
(-15.836) 
Liquidity
 t-1   -0.003*** 
(-6.118) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.121) 
-0.003*** 
(-7.738) 
-0.004*** 
(-7.464) 
-0.004*** 
(-8.271) 
0.020*** 
(4.684) 
0.003 
(0.650) 
-0.027*** 
(-7.724) 
Non-interest income
 t-1   0.006*** 
(9.214) 
0.008*** 
(12.308) 
0.008*** 
(11.755) 
0.008*** 
(11.781) 
0.008*** 
(11.416) 
0.003*** 
(4.070) 
0.018* 
(1.830) 
0.063*** 
(12.501) 
Problem loans
 t-1   -0.079*** 
(-30.994) 
-0.069*** 
(-28.153) 
-0.072*** 
(-28.938) 
-0.076*** 
(-28.655) 
-0.074*** 
(-27.756) 
-0.087*** 
(-27.757) 
-0.111 
(-0.850) 
-0.896*** 
(-28.057) 
Provisions
 t-1   0.005 
(0.576) 
0.000 
(-0.022) 
-0.005 
(-0.606) 
-0.004 
(-0.456) 
-0.009 
(-0.960) 
0.082*** 
(4.892) 
0.079 
(0.180) 
-0.299*** 
(-4.937) 
Growth
 t-1      0.032*** 
(38.715) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.146) 
   
Credit by banks
 t-1      0.000* 
(12.631) 
0.000*** 
(8.191) 
   
Constant -0.016*** 
(-14.794) 
-0.018*** 
(-15.805) 
-0.011*** 
(-10.499) 
-0.011*** 
(-10.175) 
-0.011*** 
(-10.769) 
-0.016*** 
(-13.009) 
-0.013*** 
(-10.598) 
  -0.030*** 
(-4.804) 
Optimal point 0.666*** 0.717*** 0.687*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 0.687*** 0.716*** 0.700*** 0.712*** 0.715*** 
Quarter fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes No Yes No No No 
Observations 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 509,445 509,445 540,550 524,389 557,179 
R-square (overall) 0.330 0.373 0.356 0.390 0.363 0.359 0.364   0.378 
UIT (p-value)        0.000   
WIT (Wald statistic)        28.742   
OIT (p-value)        0.354   
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of variants of equation (7). Dependent variable is the return on assets, except from regression 
(10) where dependent variable is the return on equity. All variables are defined in Table 1. Regressions (1) to (7) and (10) to (11) are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with 
robust standard errors. Regression (8) is estimated with LIML on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors. Regression (9) is estimated with Arellano and Bond first difference 
GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors. UIT is the p-value of the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be relatively high (higher than 10 as a rule of thumb) to 
reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.   
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Optimal bank credit risk: Different time-lag structure 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Return on assets t-1 0.532*** 0.489*** 0.507*** 
 (57.316) (47.470) (46.743) 
Σ(Risk-weighted assets t-1…t-3) 0.037*** 0.036***  
 (10.099) (10.288)  
Σ(Risk-weighted assets2 t-1…t-3) -0.027*** -0.026***  
 (-9.894) (-10.230)  
Risk-weighted assets t-4   0.011*** 
   
(4.256) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-4   -0.009*** 
   
(-4.347) 
Bank size
 t-1  0.001*** 0.000 
  (11.061) (1.448) 
Capital
 t-1  -0.004** -0.007*** 
 
 
(-2.390) (-8.561) 
Liquidity
 t-1  -0.002*** -0.001 
 
 
(-5.547) (-1.499) 
Non-interest income
 t-1  0.008*** 0.003*** 
  (12.829) (4.708) 
Problem loans
 t-1  -0.069*** -0.043*** 
  (-27.390) (-17.579) 
Provisions
 t-1  -0.012 0.002 
 
 
(-1.468) (0.380) 
Constant -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.005*** 
 (-8.243) (-7.674) (-5.625) 
Optimal Point 0.697*** 0.687*** 0.668*** 
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 524,389 524,389 511,173 
R-square (overall) 0.356 0.372 0.356 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (7). Dependent variable is the return on 
assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS on the 
fixed effects model with robust standard errors. The ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Optimal bank credit risk: Time-varying models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Return on assets
 t-1 0.511***  0.528*** 
 (51.009)  (48.738) 
Return on equity
 t-1  0.524***  
  (79.098)  
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.002*** 0.003 0.001 
 (3.565) (0.637) (0.554) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.016*** -0.132*** -0.053*** 
 (-4.482) (-5.374) (-3.610) 
Bank size
 t-1 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 
 (11.915) (6.880)   (2.577) 
Capital
 t-1 -0.012*** -0.097*** -0.007*** 
 (-10.853) (-16.261) (-6.385) 
Liquidity
 t-1 -0.002*** -0.027*** -0.001*** 
 (-5.874) (-7.841) (-2.894) 
Non-interest income
 t-1 0.008*** 0.063*** 0.004*** 
 (12.368) (12.576) (7.017) 
Problem loans
 t-1 -0.068*** -0.890*** -0.062*** 
 (-28.224) (-28.082) (-21.619) 
Provisions
 t-1 -0.001 -0.305*** 0.011* 
 (-0.115) (-5.027) (1.762) 
Capital ratio
 t-1    
    
Inverse risk-based capital ratiot-1    
    
Inverse risk-based capital ratio2 t-1    
    
Constant 0.002*** 0.020*** -0.001*** 
 (30.818) (29.218) (-11.131) 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 557,179 557,179 557,179 
R-square (overall) 0.407 0.385 0.390 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (8). Dependent variable is the return on assets 
in regressions (1) and (3), and the return on equity in regression (2). All variables 
are defined in Table 1. In regressions (1) and (2) estimation method is OLS on 
the fixed effects model with robust standard errors and in regression (3) OLS on 
the moving average model. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Unit root tests 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller GLS Dickey-Fuller 
 Coefficient 5% critical value Coefficient 5% Critical Value 
Output (2) -2.063  -2.921 0.828  -2.210 
Federal funds rate (2) -2.166 -2.921 -1.711 -2.210 
Realized risk (6) -1.612 -2.924 -1.245 -2.112 
Optimal risk (2) -1.766 -2.922 -1.269 -2.215 
Notes: The table reports the augmented and GLS Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, along with their 5% 
critical values. The number of lags for each series is determined by information criteria and is in 
the parenthesis next to the variable. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  
Cointegration vector 
 Output Federal funds rate Realized risk Optimal risk 
Coefficient 1.000 0.352 15.982 -22.819 
Standard deviation 0.000 0.061 5.470 4.776 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Notes: The table reports the cointegration vector given by equation (11) of the VECM given by equation (10). 
The VECM is estimated using the one stage approach of Johansen (1995). The sample spans the period 1997Q3 
to 2011Q4. 
 
 
 
38 
 
Figure 1 
Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk of failed banks 
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Figure 3 
Stability of the time-series model 
 
 
Notes: The upper part of the figure shows the recursively estimated largest eigenvalue (solid line), and its 
confidence interval (dashed lines), based on sample moments from an increasing fraction of the sample. The 
lower part of the figure shows that the recursive Tau statistics (solid line) never crosses the 95% critical value 
(dashed line) and, therefore, the null hypothesis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected. 
                     
40 
 
Figure 4 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a shock in optimal risk-weighted assets 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
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Figure 6 
Impulse response of optimal risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
 
 
 
 
 
